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sufficiently present to justify recovery.27 In its decision, the court restricted
itself merely to announcing the existence of the right to intellectual credit,
without elaborating on its protection other than by asserting that "vindication
of the claim ... is readily assimilable to the principle of an action for inter-
ference with prospective economic advantage." 28
Interference with another's obtaining employment, other than in a
legitimate competitive situation, is not a novel tort. 22 Yet to use such inter-
ference as the basis for a cause of action, the plaintiff must show that it
was intentiona1, 3° and, in New Jersey, the situs of the instant case, that it
was wanton, malicious, 31 and unjustifiable. 32 As stated in Louis Kamm, Inc.
v. Flink,33 interference with the right "to enjoy the fruits and advantages
of [one's] own enterprise, industry, skill and credit" is actionable, but only
if it is "without the justification of competition or the service of any interest
or lawful purpose." The necessity of proving an intent to interfere fed by
malice is obvious. Should the defendant in such an action be found to have
received a patent under an honest mistake as to his inventorship, or in ig-,
norance (inexcusable as it may be) of the clear mandate that applications
be filed in the name of the true inventor, it could not be said that he intended
to interfere with the plaintiff's existing or prospective economic advantage.
The law's desire to protect intellectual credit should surely not create what
would be a strict liability on a person who blunders, mistakenly or stupidly,
onto that privileged field.
The importance of the instant decision lies in its enunciation of the
right to intellectual and professional credit for inventions, and not in what-
ever hope it may raise in the plaintiff that she will prevail on this theory
should the case reach re-trial. For the facts as explained in the decision give
little indication of the defendants' intent in making the original appli-
cation in the name of the defendant supervisor. The plaintiff has, however,
a new chance to explore these issues and for this reason the instant decision,
apart from its value as a contribution to the continuing elaboration of pro-
tectible rights, is to be admired.
ROBERT J. MULDOON, JR.
Taxation—Priority of Federal Tax Lien—United States v. Vermont. 1—
In October, 1958, the state of Vermont made an assessment and demand for
withheld state income taxes of $1628 due from Cutting & Trimming, Inc., a
Vermont taxpayer. Under state law a tax lien for the amount due, plus
27 See Prosser, Torts 3-4 (1955).
28 Misani v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 83 N.J. Supe
supra note 1.
29 See Birmingham Broadcasting Co. v. Bell, 259 Ala. 656,
39 Dade Enterprises v. Wometco Theatres, 119 Fla. 70,
31 George F. Hewson Co. v. Hopper, 130 N.J.L. 525, 33 A.
32 Stein v, Schmitz, 21 N.J. Misc. 218, 32 A.2d 844 (1943)
82 113 N.J.L. 582, 587, 175 A. 62, 66 (1934), cited with
Corp. v. American Federation of Labor, Local 23132, 6 N.J.
68 So. 2d 314 (1953).
160 So. 209 (1935).
2d 889 (1943).
approval in Outdoor Sports
217, 78 A.2d 69, 75 (1951).
r. 1, 13, 198 A.2d 791, 798,
1 377 U.S. 351 (1964).
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interest and costs arose' immediately upon assessment and applied to alI
the taxpayer's property or rights to property. 2 In February, 1959, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed Cutting & Trimming for taxes
of 5365 due under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act. Under federal law,
a tax lien was created upon assessment and attached to all the taxpayer's
property and rights to property. 3 In May, 1959, the state commenced an
action on certain property to foreclose its lien, and in October, 1959, final
judgment was obtained. Prior to the securing of this judgment, the federal
tax lien had been duly filed. 4 In 1961, the United States brought suit on its
lien on the same property and the state was named a party because of its
claimed interest in that property. Both the Federal District Court in Vermont
and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held the state lien to be superior, 5
and appeal was taken to the United States Supreme Court. HELD: The
state lien has priority over the federal tax lien. The taxpayer was not in-
solvent, and since the state had a choate or perfected lien under the definition
given in United States v. New Britain,8 the rule applied is that "a prior lien
gives a prior claim. . . ." 7
The first version of sections 6321 and 6322 of the 1954 Internal Revenue
2 32 V.S.A. § 5765 (1959) provides:
If any employer required to deduct and withhold a tax under section 5761 of
this title neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount, including
interest after such demand, together with any costs that may accrue in addition
thereto, shall be a lien in favor of the state of Vermont upon all property and
rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such employer. Such
lien shall arise at the time the assessment and demand is made by the commis-
sioner of taxes • . . .
The Vermont statute is modeled after Int. Rev. Code of 1954 §§ 6321 and 6322, quoted
in note 3, infra.
8 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6321 provides:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after
demand, the amount ... shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all
property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such
person.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6322 provides:
. . . the lien imposed by section 6321 shall arise at the time the assessment is
made and shall continue until the liability for the amount so assessed is satisfied
or becomes unenforceable by reason of lapse of time.
4 riling of the federal tax lien prevented the application of Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 6323 (a), which provides:
Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c) and (d), the lien imposed by
section 6321 shall not be valid as against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or
judgment creditor until notice thereof has been filed by the Secretary or his
delegate . . . .
If the state had obtained a final judgment on its lien before the federal lien had been
filed, it would have been a judgment creditor without notice, and the present controversy
would not have arisen. See United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84 (1963),
and United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955).
5 United States v. Cutting & Trimming, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 951 (D. Vt. 1962),
aff'd sub nom. United States v. Vermont, 317 F.2d 446 (2d Cir, 1963).
6 347 U.S. 81, 84 (1954). A lien is choate when "the identity of the lienor, the
property subject to the lien, and the amount of the lien are established."
7 Rankin & Schatzell v. Scott, 25 U.S. 175, 179 (1.827).
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Code was passed in 1865.8
 Prior to 1913 it had the rather harsh effect of
giving the federal tax lien priority over the rights of a subsequent bona fide
purchaser who had no knowledge of the liens In 1933, the equivalent of
section 6323(a) was added to protect mortgagees, purchasers and judgment
creditors from an unfiled federal tax lien." Subsequently, pledgees were
added to this group." The necessity of filing a federal tax lien is absolute. 12
Even if a person who falls into a section 6323(a) category has actual notice
of an unfiled federal lien he will prevail." It follows then that a Iienor who
can qualify under section 6323(a) as a mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser or
judgment creditor, and who can prove that his lien was recorded before the
filing of the federal lien, will have priority.
However, this statute has not clarified the more perplexing problem of
whether the federal tax lien is to have an absolute priority over liens of
others than mortgagees, pledgees, etc., which were prior to the federal tax
lien, or whether the federal lien is to be subject to the common law rule that
the first in time is the first in right. There is by statute an absolute rule of
priority in cases where the taxpayer is insolvent," and it has been held
that a lien on property of an insolvent person must be reduced to title or
possession in order that it prevail over the federal claim." But where the
creditor is solvent and sections 6321 and 6322 apply, no statute establishes
priorities. The case of United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank"' intro-
duced the idea that an antecedent lien might prevail over the federal tax lien
if it were choate or perfected. In that case the court held that an attachment
lien was not choate because it created no right to proceed against the property
until a judgment was acquired." The lien was "merely a lis pendens notice
that a right to perfect a lien exists." 18
 The court also stated that it would
not be bound by state law in determining whether a lien was choate but
would make that determination as a matter of federal law." Following the
Security Trust case, a garnishment lien existing prior to the federal tax lien
8
 Act of May 3, 1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat, 470.
United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210 (1893) ; United States v. Curry, 201 Fed. 371
(D. Md. 1912). See Plumb, Federal Tax Collection and Lien Problems, 13 Tax L. Rev.
247, 459 (1958).
15 Act of March 4, 1913, ch. 166, 37 Stat. 1016.
11 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3186, added by ch. 614, § 505, 56 Stat, 957 (1942).
12 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(c) states an exception to § 6323(a). It provides
that even though a tax lien on securities is filed, it does not take priority if the subse-
quent lienor had no actual notice of it.
10 United States v. Beaver Run Coal Co., 99 F.2d 610 (3d Cir. 1938) ; Smith v.
United States, 113 F. Supp. 702 (D. Hawaii 1953) ; See Plumb, supra note 9, at 465.
14 Rev. Stat. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1958) provides:
Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent . • . the debts
due to the United States shall be first satisfied....
15 United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953).
la 340 U.S. 47 (1950); cf. United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955).
17 Before judgment was obtained, the United States filed notice of its lien, so that
the lienor could not qualify as a judgment creditor under § 6323(a).
10 United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, supra note 16, at 50.
19 Id. at 49-50.
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was held inferior because it could not be perfected until final judgment was
awarded.2°
Neither of these cases offered a suggestion about what might be a choate
lien, and it was not until New Britain21
 that one was forthcoming. There
the Court said that a perfected lien is one on which nothing more need be
done in order that it be choate, and that perfection was accomplished when
"the identity of the lienor, the property subject to the lien, and the amount
of the lien are established." 22
 Under this test, certain municipal liens for
real estate taxes and water rent due which attached to the specific property
were held perfected. However, the federal tax lien was also perfected even
though it attached to all the taxpayer's property. Consequently the case
was remanded for a finding as to which municipal liens were perfected be-
fore the federal lien."
Admittedly, the test of choateness offered in New Britain is subject to
considerable judicial interpretation. Following a policy that the purpose of
the federal tax lien is to insure prompt and certain collection of taxes due
to the United States from tax delinquents, 24
 the Supreme Court in a series
of decisions (most of which are per curiam) has consistently reversed cases
which had held liens choate under the definition in New Britain.25
 These cases
severely limit the applicability of the New Britain case, and it is apparent
that when the Court said a lien was choate if "nothing" remained to be done
to perfect it, it meant "nothing." It appears that no lien held by an individual
can be sufficiently choate if it must be enforced by court judgment. 2°
The result in United States v. Vermont was reached presumably on the
following reasoning. The New Britain case held the federal tax lien choate.
Consequently Vermont, by copying the federal statute, created a choate lien
which was judged by the same standard as the federal lien. In the absence of
legislative action, the Supreme Court apparently refuses to establish an
absolute priority of the federal lien against a solvent taxpayer. When
Vermont assesses its lien before the United States it will prevail, and the
federal government may be put to additional expense and difficulty in
securing property to satisfy its lien. Such a result seems incongruous with
the tax lien's purpose of insuring prompt and certain collection of taxes due
to the United States.
Although at first glance the decision might not seem very far reaching,
its results may be felt for some time. It will not affect prior decisions which
interpret choateness strictly, and instances of choate liens will probably
20
 United States v. Liverpool & London Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 215 (1955).
21
 United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
22
 Id. at 84.
25 United States v. New Britain, supra note 21.
24
 United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, supra note 16, at 51.
26 United States v. IluIley, 358 U.S. 66, reversing, 102 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1958) ;
United States v. Vorreiter, 355 U.S. 15, reversing, 134 Colo. 543, 307 P.2d 475 (1957) ;
United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956), reversing, 227 F.2d 359
(7th Cir. 1955) ; United States v. Colotta, 350 U.S. 808, reversing, 224 Miss. 33, 79 So.
2d 474 (1955); United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955), reversing, 224, S.C. 233, 78
S.E.2d 277 (1953).
26
 Plumb, supra note 9, at 470.
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remain quite scarce. However, it seems probable that most states, if not
all, will adopt statutes similar to the federal tax lien statute, thus giving
each state's tax lien priority over the federal lien when the state makes its
assessment first. This might eventually lead to congressional declaration of a
superiority of the federal lien.
ROBERT M. STEINBACH
Unfair Competition—Preemption by Federal Patent Law.—Sears, Roe-
buck FS Co. v. Stiff el Co.;' Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.2—
The Supreme Court recently decided two cases which will affect the area
within which the states may employ their laws of unfair competition. In the
first, Sears, Roebuck & Co. marketed a pole lamp substantially identical to
a patented lamp3 which Stiffel Co. had previously placed on the market.
Stiffel immediately began an action in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of North Carolina, which was transferred to the Northern
District of Illinois,4 charging Sears in the first count with patent infringe-
ment, and in the second, with unfair competition in that the sale of the Sears
lamp resulted in consumer confusion. The district court, invalidating the
patent for want of invention, 3 decided for Sears on the first count; but observ-
ing that the Sears lamp could cause consumer confusion and had, in fact, al-
ready caused such confusion, found for Stiffel on the second count. The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. HELD: The law of unfair competition may not be used
to prohibit the copying of an article which is unprotected by federal Taw and
which is in the public domain.
In the second case, Day-Brice Lighting, Inc. sold a patented6 lighting
fixture which had a distinctive cross-ribbed light reflector. Subsequently,
Compco Corporation's predecessor 7 placed a very similar fixture on the
market. Day-Brite then began an action for patent infringement, also charg-
ing that Compco had copied the distinctive reflector, which the public had
come to associate with Day-Brite as the manufacturer, so as to confuse and
deceive purchasers, and thus constitute unfair competition. The district court
held Day-Brite's patent invalid, but found Compco guilty of unfair compe-
tition despite the absence of fraudulent practices on the ground that the
fixture identified Day-Brite as its source and the presence of a similar fixture
on the market was likely to cause, and had in fact caused, public confusion.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
1
 376 U.S. 225, rehearing denied, 376 U.S. 973 (1964).
2 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
3
 The pole lamp was protected by design and mechanical patents.
4
 The district courts have original jurisdiction in any civil action based upon unfair
competition if joined with a substantial and related claim under federal copyright,
patent or trademark laws. 62 Stat. 931 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1948).
5
 See 66 Stat. 797 (1952), 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1958).
Day-Brite's fixture was protected by a design patent.
7 Compco Corporation had acquired the Mitchell Lighting Co. prior to the filing of
the complaint in the district court.
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